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Book Reviews
Knowing and Valuing,
The Search for Common Roots
Volume IV of
The Foundations of Ethics and
Its Relationship to Science
H. Tristram Engelhart, Jr. and Daniel Callahan, Editors
The Hastings Ce n ter, 360 Broadway, Hastings-on·Hudson, N. Y. 10706, 1980. vii +
286 pp., $9.95 (soft cover).
Knowing and Valuing is t h e fourt h a nd culminating volu m e of a series en t itl ed
T he Fou nda tions of Ethics and Its Relatio nship to Science ed ited by H. Tristram
En gelha rdt, J r., and Da niel Call ah a n. The vo lum es are t h e resul t of over fo u r years
of interdisc iplinary discuss io n s on t his ge n eral t h em e wh ich were spo nsored b y th e
Hastings Cen ter. As Engelhardt expla ins in th e introdu ction, the increasin g awareness of t h e interrelatio n of value issues w ith sc ien tific an d techn o logical issu es,
and t he reciprocal influence of these d isc iplines, have led to more fun d am ental
questi ons about the foundatio ns of eth ics a nd science and w h at correlations t h ere
may be between t h em. Perh aps the clearest conclu sion em erging from t his series
of essays is Engelhardt's statement t h at "Th e in terrelations of scie nce an d ethics
are ... many-l eveled and complex."
T he structure of t he book reflects the interdisciplinary discussions from wh ic h
it resu lts. There are six major essays eac h fo ll owed by a commentary, and two
general com mentaries at the end which reflect on both the preceding work in t h is
volume and the work of the project as a w h ole. Eac h of the major essays attem pts
to address some topic of relevance to the relat ions between ethics and scien ce.
The first essay by Alasdair MacIntyre asks t h e question of why the search for
t he foundatio ns of ethics is so frustrating. He describes the present moral climate
as one in which we are unable to reso lve con fl icts of rules or princip les at a
priority level. Although, for example, to justify a particular course of action we
might appeal to a utilitarian or contractarian or deontological approach, we have
no satisfactory way to justify tak ing one of these approaches as opposed to
another, but seem ultimately to rely on intuition to settle such debates. This, of
course, has the result that we can never convince anyone whose "intuitions" are
different from our own of the validity of our approach. MacIntyre suggests that
our situation with respect to the justification of moral rules is similar to that of a
culture which has taboo rules but has lost the larger context in which such rules
had intelligibility. Our first task, then, in seeking foundations will be to search historically for the larger contexts which made these moral approaches intelligible.
Put perhaps too simply, we cannot have an intelligible ethics apart from a metaphysics. Of course, the more difficult task of justifying the metaphysics in order
to justify the ethics remains. It isn't clear why on these larger issues we may still
not have to rely ultimately on intuition, but I think MacIntyre at the least is cor·
rect that we rely on intuition at the wrong point.
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As MacIntyre suggests that contemporary ethics needs to be seen in a larger
context, Ste phen T o ulmin suggests that science, too, has suffered from an isolation from a broader world-view. Part of his essay is an outline of why and how
science came to isolate itself, citing factors like a fear of relativism and subjectivity associated (to a mistaken degree, Toulmin thinks) with value issues, and the
move toward greater scientific specialization. It is apparent to Toulmin that this
isolation has begun to break down, e.g., in the move of science into psychology, in
bioethics, etc. To continue the task of reconnecting the sciences with the fou nd ations of ethics, Toulmin sets forth certain conditions for this work (which seem
rather protective of scientists) and then suggests levels of the scientific enterprise,
such as in providing a better understanding of the human place in the natural
world, that may cast light on the foundations of ethics.
Through a concentration on the rational bases of both science and morality,
Gunther Stent draws an interesting parallel between them - that both are
internally inconsistent. Instead of seeing this inconsistency in a lack of touch with
larger contexts as does MacIntyre, Stent argues that the incoherence is due to the
paradoxical nature of reason itself. For example, just as sc ience must d eal with the
"co mplementarity" of different theories in quantum physics , so ethics must face
the "complementarity" (and thus inconsistency) of goals such as justice and charity . If there are to be possible resolutions to these parado xes, Stent thinks they
are likely to be found in the very differen t conceptions of science and of ethics of
Far Eastern thought.
Richard D. Alexander's purpose is to outline the implications for the understanding of ethics of the refinements in evolution ary theory within biology,
specifically the theory that individual hum an behavior and culture are best
explained as results of "inclusive-fitness-maximizing" behavior. In this context,
Alexander sees ethics as deriving solely from conflicts of interest, biologically
interpreted in terms of genetic differences to which social interpretations of conflicts of interest are reducible. A descriptive analysis of past normative ethics must
focus on the problem of individuals maximizing their inclusive fitness. What is
especially interesting in Alexander's view is his contention that conscious knowledge of the genetic basis of human behavior can lead to a radical change in that
basis (perhaps even to freedom) and t hus to a radical change in the nature of
ethics.
In the fifth essay, there is a shift to theological foundations of ethics in a
primarily descriptive attempt by James M. Gustafson to layout certain th eological
assumptions which bear on the relation of theology to ethics. Most of his attention is focused on the last of his assumptions, that theology provides a way of
construing the world, more specifically that the construing is "an inte ntion to
relate to all things in ways appropriate to their relations to God." Gustafson
insists that construing the world theologically must includ e reference to the
reality of an ultimate power. This construing will give shape and substance to the
moral analyses we make as we consider the circumstances involved in actions, the
agents and their acts, the ends and consequences of actions , an d finally the meaning of the whole moral situation. Gustafson illustrates this construing in each of
these four areas, for example, in suggesting that the circumstances of the Exodus
can speak to us about current conditions of oppression. He then outlines certain
probl e ms that need to be ad dressed to attempt to relate to all things appropriate
to their relations to God. Th ese involve determining how God relates to all t hings
and how the t heologi an can claim to have such knowledge.
Only t he last of the major essays specifically focuses on the implications for
medicine of the foundations of ethics in relation to science. H. Tristram Engelhart, Jr., seeks to remind us how inescapably interrelated medicine is with valu e
and ethical issues. More spec ifically, he seeks to counter the contention of Leon
Kass that certain ethic al problems do not belong in the arena of medicine, and
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thus ought not to be problems for medical practitioners, by arguing that the arena
of medicine is properly determined by patients' complaints. In other words, any
bona fide complaint (with criteria for bona fide complaint defined at some length
by Engelhardt) is sufficient grounds for medical therapy. The medical practitioner, then, cannot define ethical problems of this sort as out of his/ her
domain, but instead must confront them .
There is not space to develop the basic points of all the commentaries (including the last two general ones by Tom L. Beauchamp and Ronald Green), some of
which (in a more positive than negative sense , I think) blur the distinction
between the commentaries and the essays. Let me just mention two that may be
of particular interest. Paul Ramsey's response to Richard Alexander suggests some
very interesting (and, I suspect, correct) reasons why the gene-proliferation theory
cannot be proven , in particular that in its own light the theory itself may only be
a means to gene-proliferation. Such unprovability does not, of course , show the
theory to be false but would certainly make us cautious in accepting it. But for
me the most interesting commentary was that of Hans Jonas who attempted to do
more concretely what he was as Gustafson's task - to show what difference to
our ethical decisions our theological beliefs might make. Jonas , who is not a theologian, identifies a difficult but necessary task for people who are not theologians
but who find significance in theological frameworks.
There is both virtue and difficulty in the interdisciplinary and group nature of
the work. For most of us who are schooled primarily in one discipline, essays
whose authors stem from another can be quite difficult. That very difficulty,
however, points to limitations that we must attempt to transcend, given the
importance of the relations between science and ethics. In this light, the work of
the Hastings Center on this project seems not only necessary but courageous in
the willingness of participants to cross disciplinary lines. I don't think anyone
would find crossing the lines in these essays insuperably difficult .
The virtue and difficulty can be seen on another level in this discussion. As
anyone knows who has tried coordinating a project, even with members of a single
discipline let alone an interdisciplinary group, it is difficult to establish a coher·
ence to the project as a whole, given that people have different interpretations of
the task, or see different questions as most important, or have different beliefs
about which levels of issues need most to be addressed. Thus, I do not think that,
other than on the very general level of the interrelation between ethics and
science, one is likely to find much coherence among all of these essays , or a sense
that there is a clear progression toward reaching answers for certain questions.
This point seems to be made by both of the final commentators as well, who agree
that there is much work yet to do . Thus, if one were approaching the book with
the expectation of gaining a much clearer understanding of what the foundations
of ethics are and how they relate to the sciences, I think one would be disappointed. Yet such complexity is, at least in my view , in tune with the world in
which we live and thus may well be a virtue rather than a fault . Engelhardt suggests in the introduction that the project may have been more successful at learning to ask the right questions than in attaining the right answers. This book surely
does raise interesting and necessary questions about the relations of science and
ethics, and points us in worthwhile directions for study and reflection. If one
shares with me those sorts of expectations from a work of this kind, I do not
think one would be disappointed.

- Linda Hansen, Ph.D.
St. John's University
Collegev ille, Minn.
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